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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1720s, Caribbean piracy was brought to a screeching
halt. An enhanced British naval presence was partly responsible for
bringing pirates to their end. But the most important factor
contributing to this result was a series of early eighteenth-century
legal changes that made it possible to prosecute pirates effectively.
This short Article’s purpose is to recount those legal changes and
document their effectiveness. Its other purpose is to analyze pirates’
response to the legal changes designed to exterminate them, which
succeeded, at least partly, in frustrating the British government’s
goal. By providing a retrospective look at antipiracy law and pirates’
reactions to that law, my hope is to supply some useful material for
thinking about how to use the law to address the contemporary piracy
problem.

* Visiting Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Becker Center on Chicago
Price Theory. BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, George Mason University. This
Article draws substantially from the sixth chapter of the Author’s book, PETER T.
LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES (2009).
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My basic conclusion is that while the law can be used to combat
piracy, it should not pretend that pirates will sit idly by as legal
changes are introduced to curb their livelihood. Pirates have always
been rational actors who will do what they can to offset legal changes
that threaten them.
The good news about pirate rationality is that through careful
rational-choice analysis, we can try to understand how pirates might
adjust their behavior in response to various legal changes that
influence their incentives. The bad news about pirate rationality is
that we need to try to predict what pirates will do when we change the
law to combat them. If pirates were like bumps on a log, legal systems
could handle them much more easily. But pirates are clever people
who are determined to circumvent legal reforms that seek to stop
them. Using the law to address piracy therefore requires strategic,
game-theoretic thinking. Because pirates are as interested in
confounding legal changes designed to prevent and punish them as
the persons making legal changes are interested in confounding
pirates, thinking about how to use the law to address piracy is more
like playing chess with a skilled opponent than playing “guess which
hand” with a toddler.
I.

ANTIPIRACY LAW BEFORE 1700

In the very early days of piracy, between 1340 and 1536, England
tried pirates under the civil law in admiralty courts. The pre-1536 law
relating to piracy was seriously flawed. Convicting someone of piracy
required either the accused to confess or two eyewitnesses, neither of
whom could be accomplices, to testify to his alleged act of piracy.
In 1536, England introduced the Offenses at Sea Act, which
rectified this deficiency by mandating that acts of piracy be tried
according to common law procedure—a procedure that permitted
1
accomplice testimony. This mandate put pirates’ fate in the hands of
a jury of twelve “peers,” which heard cases during special “Admiralty
2
Sessions” in England’s criminal courts.
Like the law relating to piracy before 1536, piracy law under the
Offenses at Sea Act was also flawed. Most significantly, it did not
provide a practical way for England’s growing colonies to handle the
1. 1536, 28 Hen. 8, c. 15 (providing that offenses of piracy would be prosecuted
based on the testimony of witnesses present on a ship when the offenses were
committed). For an excellent and more in depth account of antipiracy legislation,
see JOEL H. BAER, PIRATES OF THE BRITISH ISLES (2005).
2. 28 Hen. 8, c. 15 (providing that a jury of “twelve good and lawful inhabitants
in the Shire” would serve in piracy trials).
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pirates they captured. Although some colonies adopted their own
legal procedures relating to piracy, colonial piracy trials were rare.
Further, the High Court of Admiralty could overturn their decisions.
In 1684, most colonial trials came to a halt when the English
government decided that the colonies did not have jurisdiction to try
3
any piracy cases. The 1536 statute obligated colonial officials to ship
accused pirates and witnesses to England to attend trial. Since a great
deal of piracy took place in and around England’s distant colonies,
the Offenses at Sea Act left a serious impediment to effectively
dealing with sea bandits. As a later law read:
[I]t hath been found by Experience, that Persons committing
Piracies, Robberies and Felonies on the Seas, in or near the East
and West Indies, and in Places very remote, cannot be brought to
condign Punishment without great Trouble and Charges in
sending them into England to be tried within the Realm, as the said
Statute directs, insomuch that many idle and profligate Persons
have been thereby encouraged to turn Pirates, and betake
themselves to that sort of wicked Life, trusting that they shall not,
or at least cannot easily, be questioned for such their Piracies and
Robberies, by reason of the great Trouble and Expence that will
necessarily fall upon such as shall attempt to apprehend and
4
prosecute them for the same . . . .

Colonial governments were interested in prosecuting pirates. But
not if they had to foot the bill. Consequently, when they captured
pirates, they often just let them go. The problem that this criminal
“catch and release” policy created intensified in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries when a new wave of watery bandits
took to the sea.
Between 1690 and 1700, the “Red Sea Men,” so-named because
they did most of their prowling in the Red Sea, caused the East India
Company considerable trouble. This situation in turn prompted the
East India Company to lobby the English government to do
something about the pirate problem. In 1701, the War of the
Spanish Succession broke out, temporarily relieving the pirate
problem by diverting would-be piratical energies to legitimate
maritime marauding in the form of privateering instead. But the War

3. See JOEL H. BAER, PIRATES OF THE BRITISH ISLES 25 (2005) (explaining that
attempts to try pirates under a 1684 law were “undermined by a finding that under
the statute colonial courts lacked the jurisdiction to try pirates”).
4. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3, c. 7,
reprinted in 3 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660–
1730, at 59 (Joel H. Baer ed., 2007) [hereinafter BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE].
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of the Spanish Succession ended in 1714, leaving would-be pirates
without a legitimate outlet for their desire to steal on the sea.
A few years later, piracy in the Caribbean exploded. With many
more pirates roving about in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth-centuries, colonial officials’ inability or unwillingness to
send captured pirates to England for trial posed a serious problem.
To address this problem, legal reform was needed.
II. ANTIPIRACY LAW AFTER 1700
In response to this need, Parliament introduced An Act for the
5
More Effectual Suppression of Piracy. The new statute empowered
colonies with commissions from the Crown or the Admiralty to
preside over vice-admiralty courts to try and punish pirates on
location. The Act provided:
That all Piracies, Felonies and Robberies committed in or upon the
Sea, or in any Haven, River, Creek, or Place, where the Admiral or
Admirals have Power, Authority, or Jurisdiction, may be examined,
inquired of, tried, heard and determined, and adjudged, according
to the Directions of this Act, in any Place at Sea, or upon the Land,
in any of his Majesty’s Islands, Plantations, Colonies, Dominions,
Forts, or Factories, to be appointed for that Purpose by the King’s
Commission or Commissions under the Great Seal of England, or
6
the Seal of the Admiralty of England . . . .

In vice-admiralty courts, seven or more commissioners sat in
7
judgment of accused pirates. An accused pirate still enjoyed trial by
jury, per common law procedure, if he was tried in England. But
these protections were not afforded to him if he was tried in one of
the colonies, as was increasingly the case. In accomplishing this
change, the Act did more than just empower vice-admiralty courts to
prosecute pirates. From the government’s perspective, the legal
arrangements it established provided the best of both worlds: the Act
permitted the eyewitness testimony needed to convict pirates, per
common law procedure, but, per civil law procedure, dispensed with
the pesky jurors who were less reliably antipirate—and, thus, less
likely to convict captured sea scoundrels—and replaced them with
more reliably antipirate colonial officials who were more likely to
convict pirates.

5. 1700, 11 Will. 3, c. 7, reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra
note 4, at 59.
6. Id., reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 59.
7. Id., reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 60.
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The creation of regular colonial courts with the authority to try
pirates proved to be a tremendous boon to the government’s assault
on sea robbers. Parliament originally designed the 1700 Act to expire
in only seven years. But owing to the great effect it had in permitting
the more regular prosecution of pirates, Parliament renewed it
several times following the War of the Spanish Succession and made
8
the law permanent in 1719.
The Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy stuck two
additional thorns in the side of pirates. First, it treated active pirate
sympathizers as accessories to piracy and stipulated the same
punishments for them—death and property forfeiture—as for actual
9
pirates. According to the Act:
And whereas several evil-disposed Persons, in the Plantations and
elsewhere, have contributed very much towards the Increase and
Encouragement of Pirates . . . . Be it enacted by the Authority
aforesaid, That all and every Person and Persons whatsoever,
who . . . shall either on the Land, or upon the Seas, knowingly or
wittingly set forth any Pirate, or aid and assist, or maintain,
procure, command, counsel or devise any Person or Persons
whatsoever, to do or commit any Piracies or Robberies upon the
Seas . . . [or shall] receive, entertain or conceal any such Pirate or
Robber, or receive or take into his Custody any Ship, Vessel, Goods
or Chattels, which have been by any such Pirate or Robber
piratically and feloniously taken . . . are hereby likewise
declared . . . to be accessary to such Piracy and Robbery . . . and . . .
shall and may be . . . adjudged . . . as the Principals of such Piracies
10
and Robberies . . . .

Second, the law encouraged merchantmen to defend themselves
against pirate attacks by providing them a reward “not exceeding two
Pounds per Centum of the Freight, and of the Ship and Goods so
11
defended.”
By 1717, England not only rewarded individuals for
defensively resisting pirate aggression; it also rewarded them for
offensively initiating aggression against pirates. These rewards,
publicized in the Boston News-Letter, awarded “[f]or every Commander of
any Pirate-Ship or Vessel the Sum of One hundred Pounds; [f]or every
Lieutenant, Master, Boatswain, Carpenter, and Gunner, the Sum of Forty
8. Perpetuation of Acts, 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 19.
9. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3, c. 7
(providing that a final determination of piracy in cases involving accessories would
lead to a sentence of death or “Losses of Lands, Goods and Chattels, as if they had
been attainted and convicted”), reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra
note 4, at 60.
10. Id., reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 63.
11. Id., reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 64.
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Pounds; [f]or every Inferior Officer the Sum of Thirty Pounds; [a]nd for every
12
Private Man the Sum of Twenty Pounds.”
In 1721, Parliament bolstered antipiracy law again, this time to
13
hold accountable anyone who traded with pirates. Under the new
law, any person who “any wise trade[d] with any Pirate, by Truck,
Barter, Exchange, or any other Manner” was “deemed, adjudged and
14
taken to be guilty of Piracy” and punished as the same. Further, to
the carrot of reward money, which the 1700 law promised
merchantmen that successfully defended their ships and cargo
against a pirate attack, the 1721 law added the stick of wage forfeiture
and six months imprisonment for armed merchantmen that did not
15
try to defend themselves against pirate aggression.
Another important addition in the 1721 law punished naval vessels
charged with hunting sea rovers and protecting merchant ships from
pirates that engaged in trade instead. It seems that His Majesty’s
warships had taken to using the government’s vessels as their
personal trading convoys rather than to defend merchantmen and
capture pirates. In 1718, Jamaica’s governor complained to the
Council of Trade and Plantations as follows:
[T]he neglect of the Commanders of H.M. ships of warr, who are
said to be appointed for the suppressing of pyrates and for a
security to this Island, and protection of the trade thereof, but in
reality by their conduct, have not the least regard to the service
they are designed for . . . [and are instead engaged in] transporting
goods and merchandize which otherwise would be done by vessells
16
belonging to the Island.

By introducing stiff penalties for such behavior, the 1721 law
reduced this problem, putting stronger screws to the pirates.
III. THE HARD-PLUCKED FRUIT OF ANTIPIRACY LEGAL REFORM AND
PIRATES’ RESPONSE
Because of these legal changes, the risk of pirating increased
considerably after 1719 and 1721. Following these years, the British
government was finally able to begin to enjoy the hard-plucked fruit
of its long campaign to reform antipiracy law. To get a sense of the
12. BOSTON NEWS-LETTER, Dec. 2, 1717.
13. An Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy, 1721, 8 Geo. 1, c. 24
(declaring that anyone who assisted or traded with pirates would be punished).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Letter from Governor Sir. N. Lawes to the Council of Trade and Plantations
(June 21, 1718), reprinted in 30 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA
AND WEST INDIES, 1574–1739, at 270–72 (Karen Ordahl Kupperman, John C. Appleby,
& Mandy Banton, eds., Routledge CD-ROM, 2000).
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effects of these legal reforms, consider the following: whereas only
thirty-one percent of all pirates hanged between 1704 and 1726 were
hanged in the fifteen years spanning 1704 to 1718, sixty-nine percent
were hanged in the mere seven years spanning 1719 to 1726, with the
17
vast majority of these occurring in the years spanning 1721 to 1726.
This was great news for government officials. But it was terrible
news for pirates. As the law made pirating riskier, it made it costlier
to be a pirate and harder for pirates to find willing recruits,
threatening the viability of their criminal enterprise.
Pirates responded rationally to this increased risk with their own
tricks for circumventing punishment under the law. The primary
trick they employed for this purpose was conscription.
This
conscription had one catch, however: in many cases, it was not real.
More than a few sailors who pirates forced to join them were, in the
words of eighteenth-century pirate chronicler Captain Charles
18
Johnson, “willing to be forced.”
Once authorities apprehended them, most pirates had little to
offer in their defense at their trials. As a result, lame arguments
abounded. A key piece of accused pirate William Taylor’s defense
was that he was “given to Reading, not swearing and bullying like
19
others of them.” This argument failed to persuade the court.
The one defense that did occasionally prove effective was that
pirates had pressed a sailor into their service when they captured his
ship. The law harshly punished individuals who willingly robbed on
the sea. Most convicted pirates were hanged. Yet, courts were
reluctant to condemn men who pirates compelled into service under
the threat of death or bodily harm. If accused pirates could
demonstrate to the court that they were in fact “pressed” men, they
could escape their trials unscathed. As Captain Johnson observed,
“the Plea of Force was only the best Artifice they had to shelter
20
themselves under, in Case they should be taken.” Under the law,

17. These execution statistics are based on the data provided in DAVID
CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF LIFE AMONG
THE PIRATES 237 (1996).
18. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 65 (Manuel Schonhorn
ed., Dover Publ’ns 1999) (1724).
19. A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT, OF THE TRYAL OF ALL THE PYRATES, LATELY TAKEN
BY CAPTAIN OGLE ON BOARD THE SWALLOW MAN OF WAR, ON THE COAST OF GUINEA
(1723) [hereinafter A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT], reprinted in BRITISH PIRACY IN THE
GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 139.
20. DEFOE, supra note 18, at 248 (noting that although pirate captains did not
want to force their captives to become pirates, they knew that the men who wanted to
volunteer would rather be forced because the men could use their conscription as a
defense in the event they were tried for acts of piracy).
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“[t]he court acquitted all those who could prove that they had been
21
forced to join the pirates.”
The court that tried several of pirate captain Bartholomew
Roberts’s crewmembers in 1722 identified “the three Circumstances
that compleat a Pyrate; first, being a Voluntier amongst them at the
Beginning; secondly, being a Voluntier at the taking or robbing of
any Ship; or lastly, voluntarily accepting a Share in the Booty of those
22
that did.” Or, as the court that tried William Kidd indicated:
[T]here must go an Intention of the Mind and a Freedom of the
Will to the committing an Act of Felony or Pyracy. A Pyrate is not
to be understood to be under Constraint, but a free Agent; for in
this Case, the bare Act will not make a Man guilty, unless the Will
23
make it so.

Voluntary complicity with a pirate crew was important to
establishing guilt. Pirates exploited this loophole by pretending to
conscript seamen who joined their ranks voluntarily. Since pirates
did genuinely compel some seamen to join their companies, court
officials considered the impressment defense plausible.
For their ruse to work, pirates needed to concoct evidence that
they were conscripts. Although many pirates attempted to escape
punishment by simply claiming they were forced, absent
corroborating evidence to this effect, the impressment defense did
not usually persuade the courts. Pirates generated convincing
evidence of their impressment in two ways. First, conscripts, real and
pretend, asked their captured fellow sailors, who the pirates released,
to advertise their impressment in popular London or New England
newspapers. If authorities ever captured the pirates the “conscripts”
sailed with, “conscripts” could use the newspaper ads verifying their
forced status as evidence in their defense. For instance, after being
“forced on Board” Captain Roberts’s ship, Edward Thornden
“desired one of his Ship-Mates . . . to take notice of it, and incert it in
24
the Gazette.”
Out of guilt, pity, or perhaps even complicity, most released sailors
were only too willing to place ads for their unfortunate friends. If
they were not, a little palm grease could help things along. Sailors
21. CORDINGLY, supra note 17, at 233 (providing the example of Henry Glasby
who, after escaping from capture, returned to the pirates and was “forced” to
become a pirate).
22. DEFOE, supra note 18, at 249–50 (observing that the court wanted to ensure
that the prisoners “[had] all fair Advantages to excuse or defend themselves” and
would therefore allow any evidence regarding these three circumstances).
23. Id. at 449.
24. A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT, supra note 19, at 92.
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considered these ads such important evidence of their innocence that
they had no compunction about paying fellow crewmembers to place
them. Mariner Nicholas Brattle “gave all his Wages” to his captain “to
25
put him in the Gazette as a forced Man.”
“Ads of force” were a marvelous invention for conscripted sailors.
They were equally useful to volunteers who wanted to insure
themselves against conviction in the event of their capture. Such
sailors could join the pirates, ask their released colleagues to place an
advertisement in the paper verifying their conscription, and proceed
to go roving about with the comforting knowledge that if the law
caught up with them, they had a reasonable shot of getting off as
forced men. Moreover, this invention was an excellent recruiting
tool for pirates. By reducing the cost of piracy, “ads of force” made it
easier for pirates to find volunteers in the face of a more dangerous
26
legal environment.
The second ruse that seamen who were eager to join the pirates
used to insure themselves against later conviction worked to enhance
the first. Such sailors staged “shows” of pirate impressment in
coordination with their attackers, which they acted out in front of
their more scrupulous sailing companions who had no intention
of becoming “Brethren in Iniquity.” For example, when pirates
attacked a merchant ship, the ship’s crewmembers who wanted to
join the pirates might devise a plan whereby one of the aspiring sea
bandits would pull aside the pirate captain or quartermaster and
inform him of their desire to join the company. The eager sailors
would then request their pirate captor to make a public spectacle of
compelling their service to convince their fellow crewmembers who
did not desire to join that they were conscripted. “Their request was
granted with much waving of cutlasses and brandishing of pistols and
shouting in the hearing of the officers and men on the merchant ship
27
who were not going to join the pirates.” Captain Roberts asked one
prize’s crewmembers “whether they were willing to go with them? for
that he would force no body; but they making no Answer, he cry’d,
these Fellows want a show of Force” and pretended to conscript the

25. Id. at 99.
26. See BOSTON NEWS-LETTER, Oct. 10, 1723 (providing an example of an “ad of
force” for Francis Palmer and Philip Stokes).
27. PATRICK PRINGLE, JOLLY ROGER: THE STORY OF THE GREAT AGE OF PIRACY 115
(1953) (describing this additional method captured pirates used at trial to prove that
they were forced to become pirates).
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sailors, who in reality had “agree[d] one with another to enter.” As
Captain Johnson put it, “the pretended Constraint of Roberts, on
them, was very often a Complotment between Parties equally
29
willing.”
Shows of force helped legitimize the advertisements that pretend
conscripts used to insure themselves against the risk of conviction if
authorities captured them. Since honest captives believed they had
witnessed their comrades’ conscription, they had no scruples about
placing ads publicizing the “victims’” names in the newspaper.
Further, since witnesses to shows of force believed this force was
genuine, they could supply compelling testimony of their former
crewmen’s compelled status at trial if authorities later captured the
pirates.
30
According to historian Patrick Pringle, “[t]his ruse often worked.”
It worked because courts relied on observer testimony about accused
pirates’ free or coerced status in determining their guilt or
innocence. For instance, pirate prisoners Stephen Thomas, Harry
Glasby, and Henry Dawson testified on accused pirate Richard Scot’s
behalf at his trial. All three testified that Scot “was a forced Man.”
What persuaded them of this was Scot’s demeanor and behavior
while among the pirate crew. Scot, they deposed, “lamented his Wife
and Child . . . with Tears in his Eyes” and “never received any
31
Share” in the pirates’ plunder.
“The Court from these several
Circumstances concluded he must be a forced Man” and acquitted
32
him.
Similarly, eyewitness testimony that a sailor seemed to act freely or
was pleased to be among the pirates could be crucial in establishing
his guilt. According to the testimony of one pirate captive:
I was a Prisoner, Sir, with the Pyrates when their Boat was ordered
upon that Service, and found, upon a Resolution of going, Word
was pass’d thro’ the Company, Who would go? And I saw all that

28. A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT, supra note 19, at 128 (indicating that pirate
captains knew of the forced pirate’s defense and therefore played along with the
captured sailors’ apparent resistance to volunteer).
29. DEFOE, supra note 18, at 248 (indicating further that forcing a captured sailor
into piracy was often a strategy understood by both pirate captain and prisoner and
used to preserve this defense).
30. PRINGLE, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that providing witnesses with a
believable display of resistance to being forced to become a pirate, in addition to ads
of force, sometimes worked in proving the defense).
31. A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT, supra note 19, at 105 (showing that courts would
also take a suspected pirate’s behavior into account when determining whether he
was “forced”).
32. Id.
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did, did it voluntarily; no Compulsion, but rather pressing who
33
should be foremost.

The court found the pirates he testified against guilty and
sentenced them to hang. By the same token, a sailor stupid enough
to publicly declare his piratical desires could expect eyewitness
testimony to this effect at his trial if pirates later captured his crew
and he went along with them. One such sailor, Samuel Fletcher,
whose fellow seamen heard him say “several times [he] wish’d to God
Almighty they might meet the Pyrates,” and later in fact did, was
34
confronted with his wish at his trial and found guilty of piracy.
The artificial pirate press was not an iron-clad way to escape
punishment. Courts viewed the common claim of conscription—
even corroborated by an ad of force as evidence—with considerable
suspicion. For example, accused pirate Joseph Libbey, who “said he
was a forced Man, and was detained by [the pirate captain Ned Low],
and produced an Advertisement of it” in his defense at his trial was
35
nevertheless convicted of piracy and sentenced to hang.
Still, the pirates’ ploy was sometimes effective. The popularity of
ads of force tracks the risk of pirating. This in turn tracks the
implementation of eighteenth-century antipiracy legal reforms. Of
all ads of force published in the Boston News-Letter between 1704 and
1726, only seven percent appeared in the fifteen years spanning 1704
to 1718. Ninety-three percent of these ads appeared in the mere
seven years spanning 1719 to 1726, most of them between 1721 and
36
1726—the same years when most pirate convictions occurred.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties of prosecuting modern pirates are different from
those of combating sea dogs in piracy’s “Golden Age.” Before 1700,
the most important obstacle to prosecuting pirates was the absence of
a colonial judicial apparatus for trying pirates seized in and
around Britain’s North American and Caribbean territories. Today
the biggest obstacles to prosecuting pirates are international.
International law empowers nations to try pirates seized on the “high
33. DEFOE, supra note 18, at 261 (relating what he knew of the robbery of the
King Solomon).
34. A FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT, supra note 19, at 90 (demonstrating that
evidence of willingness to join the pirates could be equally harmful to the
defendant’s case).
35. TRYALS OF THIRTY-SIX PERSONS FOR PIRACY 171 (1723), reprinted in BRITISH
PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 4, at 187.
36. The Author collected these data from his review of issues of the BOSTON
NEWS-LETTER between 1704 and 1726.

LEESON.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.SECOND (DO NOT DELETE)

1230

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/17/2010 6:44 PM

[Vol. 59:1219

seas” or off their coasts in their domestic courts. The problem is not
that government officials lack the authority to try pirates “on
location.” On the contrary: today the major problem seems to be
that governments do not want to try pirates “on location” because of
37
perceived obstacles of international law. Thus the legal lessons from
piracy’s Golden Age derive not from particular, substantive features
of antipiracy law. Rather, they derive from what we learn about
pirates and legal reforms designed to thwart them.
That lesson is clear: pirates are rational actors and should be
treated as such. They will not sit by idly as governments attempt to
use the law to blot them out of existence. They will respond to those
attempts by offsetting them in unexpected ways where they can, and
possibly by frustrating reforms that fail to account for their
rationality. The pirates of the Golden Age succeeded with these
approaches to a limited extent. But the antipiracy legal reforms
introduced in the first two decades of the eighteenth-century so
strongly stacked the deck against sea dogs that theirs became a losing
battle. Pirate rationality prolonged pirates’ existence, but not for
long.
There was nothing inevitable about this result, however; and there
is no reason that governments should expect to be so fortunate again.
As policymakers turn their attention to addressing contemporary
pirates, it therefore behooves them to bear in mind that pirates, like
other people, are not passive responders to the law. As (or if) the law
becomes an important constraint on pirates’ behavior, they will seek
to offset its effects. Pirates will manipulate the law as the law
manipulates them.

37. See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánomo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the
difficulty of fighting pirates because of a tension between various sources of
international law, including the Geneva Convention and the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371122.

